While this institutionalist perspective generates important insights into issues of international governance, its statism and functionalism obscure important features. First, the functionalist treatment of international institutions and IOs reduced them to technical accomplishments, slighting their political character and the political work they do.
It also presumes that the only interesting or important functions that IOs might perform are those that facilitate cooperation and resolve problems of interdependent choice.
From International Relations to Global Society - Oxford Handbooks
Secondly, the statism of many contemporary treatments of IOs reduced them to mere tools of states, akin to how pluralists treated the state. IOs are mechanisms or arenas through which others usually states act. The regimes literature is particularly clear on this point. Regimes are not purposive actors. IOs are thus passive structures; states are the agents who exercise power in this view. The impact of IOs is not limited to the functions assigned to them by states and the regulation of already existing state interests. IOs also construct the social world in which cooperation and choice take place.
They help to define the issues that need to be governed and propose the means by which governance should occur Barnett and Finnemore They help define the interests that states and other actors have, not only as a forum where persuasion takes place, but also as an actor that is engaged in processes of socialization Checkel In fact, the growing recognition that IOs might have authority and power has encouraged scholars to worry that runaway IOs might become modern-day Frankensteins, where the inventors are no longer able to control their creation.
Consequently, there is now a growing interest in what happens when decisional authority is scaled up to IOs that have more autonomy and more power than ever before; the issue is not only effectiveness but also legitimacy and accountability Barnett and Finnemore ; Grant and Keohane There has also been a burgeoning study of transnational relations.
Similar to the study of IOs, the study of transnationalism had an earlier moment in the sun, faded in the shadow of state-centrism, and has now returned with a burst of energy. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye introduced the study of transnational politics in the early s, but that particular research agenda did not prosper in the short term, with the exception of some increased attention to transnational corporations in world politics.
Ernst Haas and John Ruggie explored the role of various kinds of knowledge communities and transnational networks for understanding forms of international change and cooperation Ruggie et al. These literatures proved to be ahead of their time. By the early s, though, international relations scholars began to rediscover transnationalism and transnational actors. One of the first important formulations was the work on epistemic communities, which focused on how transnationally connected experts with shared technical knowledge could influence state policy in situations of high complexity and uncertainty Adler and Haas ; Haas A new literature on transnational advocacy networks, global civil society, and transnational social movements identified these actors as participants in global politics and documented their ability to create norms and contribute to regime formation and implementation Sikkink ; Keck and Sikkink ; Price ; ; Thomas ; Tarrow In contrast to epistemic communities that were formed around scientific knowledge and expertise, these groups formed primarily around shared principled ideas.
Another strand examines so-called dark networks including terrorist groups and criminal networks around drugs and trafficking Kahler Regardless of whether one considers transnationalism, on balance, a good or a problematic development, there is general agreement that transnational actors can influence the course of global affairs.
A distinguishing characteristic of many of these transnational actors is that they are organized in network forms. Organizational theorist Walter Powell calls them a third mode of organization, distinctly different from markets and hierarchy. The dominant forms of communication in global politics email and the World Wide Web have networked forms that are increasingly beyond the complete control of states.
Terrorist organizations are viewed as being organized around networks, making them more difficult for states to monitor, locate, and incarcerate. Global corporations are discovering and adopting network forms of organization. Networks have various positive and negative attributes. They have flexibility, speed, informality, a greater chance for increasing multiple views, and perhaps even enhanced implementation capacities Slaughter ; Weber Nevertheless, increasingly hybrid network forms of governance are emerging that may combine state and nonstate actors to carry out key governance tasks.
Finally, there is perhaps no more persuasive evidence of the rise of global society than the ability of nonstate actors and even individuals to participate directly in global politics without being mediated by the state. This ability finds formal recognition in human rights regimes, where increasingly individuals can bring claims against their own state to international human rights institutions, and where individuals can now be held accountable for acts crimes against humanity or genocide that previously were attributed to states. The rise of individual criminal accountability in the global system, as evidenced in the increase in human rights trials, can thus be seen as a p.
What and whom we study necessarily leads to a consideration of how we study. There is now greater epistemological eclecticism and methodological diversity than ever before. While there are various reasons for growing epistemological diversity, arguably most important was the recognition of the underlying social character of international relations. They argued that, while the very definition of regimes involves inherently intersubjective norms and principles, the prevailing positivist epistemology of international relations made it impossible to explain, assess, or capture the social aspect of life.
A genuinely social science cannot model itself only after the natural sciences; international relations scholars of a global society must embrace epistemologies that are appropriate to the task. There is no single path. Some have gravitated toward interpretative social science, frequently drawing from Max Weber and other classical sociological theorists, to understand how actors give significance and meaning to their actions and the intersubjective understandings that frequently constitute social action.
Others have gravitated toward forms of scientific realism and theories of discourse, hoping to identify broad patterns of action and inaction. In this important sense, post-positivist scholars operate with a much broader understanding of causality than do positivist scholars; underlying, unobservable structures that make some action possible, difficult, or unimaginable do important explanatory work. Alongside an increasing diversity of epistemological positions is an increasing array of methodologies. The use of alternative methodologies to address the same questions has deepened our theoretical understanding and enhanced our empirical analysis.
Consider two prominent areas in the study of global governance. The first is compliance. Behavioral approaches to the study of norms typically attempt to measure behavioral conformity with norms that are written in formal treaties and agreements p. Instances of compliance or noncompliance, in other words, are defined by the scholar as deviations from some measure developed by the analyst of what constitute behavior consistent with expectations codified in the agreement. Interpretative approaches go beyond behavior.
They aspire to recover how actors interpret what counts as compliance and defection; whether there is an intersubjective understanding of what compliance demands in particular social situations; the kinds of justifications that are used for acts of noncompliance; and the motivations and reasons that actors give for compliance and noncompliance Kratochwil and Ruggie ; Koh ; Kingsbury Another area is the study of legitimacy. Certainly any international order that has a modicum of legitimacy will be reflected in behavior that is consistent with the international norms that define that order.
Consequently, there should be behavioral effects, effects that can be observed and captured through comparative statics. In this regard, claims about the increasing or decreasing legitimacy of an IO, treaty, or agreement should be evident not only in rates of compliance but also with changes in the willingness of states to rally to its defense, to punish those who violate its norms, and to provide various kinds of resources Clark ; Clark and Reus-Smit Yet we should also want to understand why legitimacy is conferred, what are the contests over what constitutes a legitimate international order, and what sorts of practices are considered to be appropriate as a consequence.
Not only are particular substantive areas benefiting from the application of diverse methodological approaches, but individual scholars are demonstrating greater agility as they are using multimethod approaches. Increasingly, some scholars who use quantitative methods are asked to supplement their large-n studies with well-selected cases, while qualitative scholars are also turning to some quantitative approaches or formal models.
The reason for this development is the desire to balance the strengths and weaknesses of each approach: Large-n studies are very good at helping to determine broad patterns across space and time, but well-designed case studies can be essential for identifying and exploring the causal mechanisms that account for the relationship between independent and dependent variables. The what, who, and how raise fundamental issues regarding the why we study global politics.
Or, more precisely, why should we study world politics? A vibrant discipline of international relations depends on the presence of a community of scholars who are collectively engaged in providing creative explanations and innovative insights into concerns of global importance that have potential relevance beyond that scholarly community. Theory development and methodological innovation is central to this task, but sometimes international relations theorists have become enamored with theory and method for their own sake, turning means into ends.
This can lead to sterile paradigm wars and disengagement from the problems and practices of global relations. Reus-Smit and D. Snidal Oxford: Oxford University Press p. Most of us got into this business to explore and explain particular puzzles. We are motivated by the need to understand and explain developments and changes in global politics and to keep up with the world that often surprises and shocks us. In particular, we are motivated by the need to understand and explain change in global society. He argued that realism was unable to explain key changes in the international system because it was missing both a dimension of change and a determinant of change.
Other authors have claimed that realism has likewise been unable to explain the most important changes in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, in particular, the consolidation of the European Union, the end of the cold war, the emergence of the war of terror, and the explosion of IOs, international law, and networks.
New theories have made some important contributions to understanding specific changes in global society, but have not yet provided a comprehensive theory of change. An increasingly common position is to reject the possibility of a grand theoretical synthesis.
Oxford: Oxford University Press that a much more promising avenue is to develop eclectic theorizing that can be used to explain worldly problems with an eye toward how such eclecticism might or might not contribute to broader theoretical arguments. Secondly, many of us decided on a career in international relations not only because we wanted to observe and explain from a cool distance but also because we hoped our knowledge might improve the conduct and character of global politics.
There is a long story about how, why, and when the social sciences largely abandoned the idea of practical engagement, a story that revolves around the quest for objectivity and the belief that practical engagement would pollute a pure science, the obsession with theory-building and methods, the desire to train graduate students for life in the academy and to forgo the idea of educating young professionals who might have a career in the public and nonprofit sectors Anderson The consequence is that scholars are no longer actively engaged in practical politics.
To be sure, there are moments when scholars attempt to comment on the controversies of the day in various forums, but the overall incentive structure is to orient scholars toward the community of scholars rather than toward policy-relevant research. International relations scholars need to think through how to connect their theories and knowledge to practical action, and one possibility concerns a more substantial interest in marrying international ethics to empirical analysis.
Because of its roots in critical theory and critical social science, critical international relations theory has always been attentive to the relationship between theory and praxis, p. We are very sympathetic to the importance of attempting to uncover the structures that produce forms of oppression and hinder the ability of individuals to control their fates. However, this formulation has encouraged many who associate themselves with critical international relations theory to dismiss out-of-hand political interventions that are deemed insufficiently radical. But what, precisely, is ethically problematic with an engagement that aspires to make small but consequential changes in the lives of others?
Is a practical politics that both makes small improvements and works toward more thoroughgoing change impossible? Where is the evidence that radical change has led to radical emancipation? The empirical engagement with ethics underscores that moral judgment requires evaluation not just of principles but also of consequences. Resolving empirical questions about consequences is important for making normative judgments about desirable policies. It is not only a question of determining which policies are good and bad, but rather specifying the conditions under which different policies can lead to better or worse outcomes.
Because the theorizing about consequences is an inherently comparative and empirical enterprise, empirically oriented scholars can make an important contribution Nye ; Sikkink Thus ethical judgment requires the best empirical research we can do, using all the research tools at our disposal. The research will often involve difficult counterfactuals, complex research designs, and demanding evidence. Well-intentioned researchers will disagree about results. But we can improve our discussions by being more explicit about our processes of ethical reasoning and by relating our research findings more explicitly to their normative implications.
A paradigm-driven or methods-mad discipline is an intellectual and professional dead end because it allows scholars to feel satisfied with the resulting intellectual fragmentation and detachment from the world. There are many possible paths for reattaching these severed ties, and several of the chapters in this volume suggest different possibilities for greater dialogue among scholars and engagement with practical politics.
Not every scholar needs to be equally engaged in dialogue or practical politics, and there are reasons to foster an intellectual division of labor. But such a division needs to be situated in the context of a general agreement that p. All disciplines, if they are to have any coherence whatsoever, must have an overarching narrative. The anarchy thematic has helped to generate coherence for the discipline of international relations.
It provided a common narrative that focused on states as actors that were struggling to maintain their security and generate wealth in an inhospitable environment. It helped to define the boundaries of the field and distinguish the study of international relations from the study of comparative politics. It focused scholarly attention on a manageable set of issues that could be subjected to theoretical emendation and empirical analysis.
It provided a coherent account of the discipline that could be passed down from one generation to the next. The anarchy thematic served various useful functions. Yet this singular narrative also bred theoretical, intellectual, and empirical myopia. Theories that escaped the territorial trap were marginalized or ostracized on various grounds, including the view that they were not contributing to the core debates in the field.
Students were advised against certain dissertation topics for example, human rights, gender because it would marginalize them in the field. The pluralization of the discipline did not occur because the mainstream digested the ethos of deliberative democracy, but rather because of theoretical shortcomings, empirical anomalies, and new items on the global agenda that demanded new approaches. Consequently, many scholars who once believed that they were on the outside of the discipline looking in rejoiced at the decline of the anarchy thematic and the demise of the territorial trap.
- Excel 2016 for Educational and Psychological Statistics: A Guide to Solving Practical Problems.
- Towards a Multipolar Civil Society.
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This growing diversity, however welcome, also risks generating disciplinary fragmentation, because there no longer exists a single, overarching story. We hesitate to propose an alternative narrative precisely because there is no magical formulation that can avoid prematurely foreclosing diverse perspectives and voices.
However, the concept of governance has been emerging as a worthy alternative to anarchy because of its ability to interrogate enduring, heretofore neglected, and emerging issues in the theory and practice of international relations. Governance is about how actors p. Accordingly, the study of global governance is ultimately concerned with how rules are created, produced, sustained, and refined, how these rules help define the purpose of collective action, and how these rules control the activities of international, transnational, and increasingly domestic action.
A narrative of global governance, then, would have to consider both centralized and decentralized forms of governance. International relations scholars have tended to focus on centralized rules, particularly those that exist in inter-state agreements, treaties, and conventions. But we must become more aware of the different kinds of organizational forms and architectures through which global governance occurs. In particular, we must be attentive to the possibility of governance through decentralized rule, including governance through networks that link the public and private realms Chimni ; Ruggie Global governance has evolved from a state-dominated affair to include a panoply of actors even as states retain considerable privileges and prerogatives.
In general, states do not exhaust the mechanisms of reproduction or transformation, and by stalking states we overlook other suspects that are the source and governor of international change.
Michael N. Barnett and Kathryn Sikkink
Any consideration of global governance must necessarily be concerned not only with collective action and international cooperation but also with questions of power. These different conceptualizations provide different answers to the fundamental question—when and in what respects are actors able to control their own fate? The narrative of global governance must also marry the theoretical and the normative.
Indeed, much of the recent literature on global governance has moved from a consideration of the need for governance in order to enhance collective action and minimize market failures all implicitly desirable outcomes to a more thoroughgoing consideration of the relationship between the different forms of governance and their relationship to basic issues such as legitimacy, accountability, representation, and democracy.
For instance, some forms of governance might be effective but illegitimate, and, if they are viewed by peoples as illegitimate, then they might be inherently p. Other forms may be legitimate but ineffective. This has led scholars to posit the possibility of alternative governance forms that can produce both effective and legitimate outcomes, a sterling instance in which theoretical and empirical analysis is married to practical politics. In summary, we have argued that international relations is now a discipline focused on the governance of a global society.
This has transformed whom, what, how, and why we study international politics. We now study a wider range of both public and private actors, recognizing that such actors both are engaged in governance tasks and, at times, embody legitimate authority. Rather than engaging in sterile struggles over paradigms and methods, we will need to use all the theoretical and methodological tools at our disposal to capture the complex and social nature of global society and global governance.
These tools need to be capable of helping scholars understand processes and sources of global change, not only to explain the dynamics of global society, but also to permit scholars to engage more directly in helping shape the direction of that change. Adler, E. Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Find this resource:. Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program. International Organization , — Agnew, J.
The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory. Review of International Political Economy , 1: 53— Anderson, L. New York: Columbia University Press. Barnett, M. Power in Global Governance. New York: Cambridge University Press. Political approaches. Weiss and S. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Biersteker, T. State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Bukovansky, M. Bull, H.
London: Macmillan. Buzan, B. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. From International to World Society? Checkel, J. International institutions and socialization in Europe: introduction and framework. Chimni, B. International institutions today: an imperial global state in the making. European Journal of International Law , 1— Globalization and International Relations Theory. Legitimacy in International Society. New York: Oxford University Press. Resolving international crises of legitimacy, special issue.
Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit
International Politics , — Conca, K. Old states in new bottles? The hybridization of authority in global environmental governance. Barry and R. Boston: MIT Press. Cox, R. Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory. Millennium: Journal of International Studies , — Finnemore, M. International norm dynamics and political change.
Keohane, and S. Cambridge, Mass. Gilpin, R. Gourevitch, P. Domestic politics and international relations. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. Thousand Oaks, Calif. Grant, R. Accountability and abuses of power in world politics. American Political Science Review , 29— Haas, P. Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination. International Organization , 1— Held, D. Stanford, Calif. Hurd, I.
Legitimacy and authority in international politics. Kahler, M. Political networks: power, legitimacy and governance. Unpublished typescript. Kapstein, E. Power, fairness, and the global economy. Katzenstein, P. Many of the practical problems, legal issues and financial implications inherent to the interaction of civil society with the UN system are presented in the background paper on the UN System and Civil Society: an inventory and analysis of practices, prepared for the Panel by John Clark and Zehra Aydin.
But there are also questions of a strategic and contextual dimension that have to be taken into account by the Panel. Some of them are linked to the recent geo-political changes and developments. Risks and opportunities of the international scenario. The decade of the 90s' was marked by the enthusiasm generated by the UN World Conferences.
Today, however, the perception that significant progress was being achieved has been replaced by a sense of disappointment. There is an undeniable deficit of political regulation and democratic governance in some key areas of the globalization process. There is in particular a clear discrepancy between economics and politics, between the interdependence of markets and the absence of effective global mechanisms for supervision and control.
The United Nations structures entrusted with preserving peace and security also suffer from deficits of governance. As a consequence of the difficulties to 'discipline and democratize globalization', the radicalization of the 'anti-globalization movement' led to disruptive forms of public protest and to the questioning by a segment of civil society of the very legitimacy of some multilateral institutions. Many NGOs feel frustrated with the obstacles and barriers to substantive participation in policy decision-making and in the actual implementation of agreed programs.
Several of them also react to what they perceive as the risk of being confined to the social and humanitarian field. Conversely, many governments react to increased interaction with civil society, perceiving their growing influence in the decision-making process as a threat to their national interests and sovereignty. This perception is compounded by the fact that there is a great imbalance in the numbers, capacity to influence and resources between NGOs from the industrialized and the developing countries. Civil society is not only diverse and complex.
It is also deeply divided on its political options and tactical approaches to several issues. This is not in itself a problem, insofar as democracy is, intrinsically, a conflictive space. However, contrary to an often idealized self-image, civil society is not the realm of 'good values and intentions' in contrast to the logic of power and interests ascribed to national states.
Civic and community groups may also advocate for causes that are deeply controversial and, in some instances, incompatible with universally-accepted norms and principles. Of much deeper concern are the dark sides and murky corners of what has been called the 'uncivil society'. Global terrorism and the drug trade are potent expressions of the destructive power of non-state criminal networks and of their capacity to inflict tremendous damage not only to specific countries but to the international order as a whole. To these problems it is inescapable to add the consequences of the recent upsurge of unilateralist approaches expressed in the decision not to sign or ratify major internationally negotiated agreements.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, , legitimate security concerns led to the much contested military intervention in Iraq without consent of the Security Council. Given the fact that the only forum entitled to produce rules of universal acceptance is the United Nations, unilateral action taken outside its framework cannot fail to undermine not only the Organization but the whole long and arduous effort of the international community to strengthen global governance. There is no alternative to dialogue and deliberation in order to produce generally-accepted rules and norms.
Ideological or religious definitions by some national states of what is good and of what is evil can always be met by definitions from other states pointing at the opposite direction. Cosmopolitan law is the very opposite of the imposition by the strong of their particular judgements as absolute paradigms. On the other hand, as most crises do, the current one is also producing new visions and perspectives. Citizens from all over the world have shown an unprecedented capacity of organization and mobilization, making full use of the information technologies to express their opposition to the war in Iraq.
Internet facilitated their networking and 'soft coordination', leading some to see in the emergent global civil society and world public opinion the most effective counterpoint to unilateralist positions. Civil society's capacity to influence is also reinforced by the impact of the mass media on the conduct of public affairs and the increasing plurality of available sources of information. These converging trends create an environment in which political pressure and social demands are being directly expressed to power-holders, bypassing the traditional structures of political representation.
Question 1: how to combine a broad, inclusive definition of civil society with the recognition of its diversity and the need for flexible rules of engagement. The ways through which civil society interacts with the UN and influences global governance are also diversified, ranging from advocacy and public protest to consultation and partnership with different agencies and programs. The choice of this comprehensive definition raises a number of questions.
Some subgroups - such as the private sector, the media, parliamentarians or local authorities - do not necessarily consider themselves as fitting into the civil society institutional category. Many NGOs, on the other hand, think that the private sector should not be considered as part of civil society. The goals, motivations and patterns of interaction with the UN of these actors are indeed quite distinctive. The Panel will have to consider under which circumstances it is possible or desirable to propose common recommendations and guidelines for civil society as a whole or whether it is advisable to design multiple strategies capable of eliciting the fullest participation from each one of the potential partners.
Question 2: how to combine the strengthening of civil society at the national level with the promotion of citizen involvement with global issues. The vast majority of civil society organizations are nationally-based and issue-oriented. In the last decades the number of NGOs with a global outreach increased significantly. Most of them, however, focus their mission on a given area of interest.
These more focused organizations tend to interact with the UN only when the issue on the agenda is of direct concern to them. Given civil society's wide institutional diversity and multiplicity of areas of interest it is pertinent to ask the classical question as to 'who speaks for humankind' or 'from the point of view of humankind'. It is also worth noting that democracy has been, in theory and in experience, a national construction. In many countries the strengthening of democracy and citizenship is an on-going process.
The patterns of relationship between State and civil society also vary hugely from country to country. In some the question is not even present at the national agenda. On the other hand, given the interrelation of the national and global spheres as well as the interconnection of issues, citizen initiatives, whatever their scope, if successful tend to go beyond territorial barriers and influence broader processes.
Advocacy and political pressure also combine simultaneous levels of action, moving back and forth from the local to the global and vice-versa. In a complex world, the answer to the question 'who speaks for whom' calls for new perspectives. The legitimacy of civil society organizations derives from what they do and not from whom they represent or from any kind of external mandate.
In the final analysis, they are what they do. The power of civil society is a soft one. It is their capacity to argue, to propose, to experiment, to denounce, to be exemplary. It is not the power to decide. Such legitimacy is, by definition, a work in progress. It is never attained once and for all. It is gained in the arena of public debate and must be continually renewed and revitalized. This open-ended conversation, involving many actors pursuing different - and sometimes divergent - interests, is more than the sum of its parts.
The debate and deliberation generated by civil society is at the heart of contemporary global governance. The Panel will have to take into account and make sense of this diversity of players and plurality of levels of action. Strengthening civil society's interaction with the UN does not mean acting only at the highest levels of the system. Concomitant with the trend toward greater citizen involvement is the equally vigorous trend toward decentralization of power and resources to the local level.
These processes present civil society with unprecedented opportunities for more horizontal forms of interaction and collaboration with UN programs and local authorities. Question 3: how to combine support for civil society's role in global governance with the preservation of national sovereignty and equity in international relations.
Civil society has a capacity to act on its own that is not dependent on any authorization or mandate. And yet, given the intergovernmental character of the United Nations, the rules of their engagement with the UN system depend, on the final analysis, on decisions to be taken by the Member States. There is a growing recognition, based on experience, that collaboration and partnership involving multiple actors increases the available stock of ideas, capacities and resources to deal with a given problem.
The key question, then, is how to overcome still existing mutual prejudices and misconceptions so that governments do not associate greater civil society influence with the undermining of their sovereignty and the widening of the power imbalances between the North and the South. Enhancing the capacities and resources of Southern civil society is a pre-condition for correcting existing distortions and inequalities. Paradoxically, Northern domination within civil society can only be reinforced by the restrictions imposed by the governments of some developing countries on their domestic civic sector.
Hence the critical importance of promoting collaborative patterns of dialogue and partnership between State and civil society at the national level. Several Member States feel that civil society direct participation in the decision-making process could undermine the intergovernmental process. These concerns must be given careful attention by the Panel. It is absolutely essential to reduce distrust, demonstrate the effectiveness of collaboration and build consensus around a positive agenda for the future. A vibrant and forceful national civil society, working together with government, far from weakening democracy and good governance, increases the national resources invested in social development and strengthens the country's voice in global issues.
In the same way that civil society can act without asking for any kind of permission or authorization there may also be legitimate limits to their direct participation in the intergovernmental decision-making process. Too much emphasis on gaining power to influence decisions may be counter-productive, generating a backlash.
Not everything has to be regulated to take place and have an impact. Flexible arrangements that enable the UN system to value civil society's ideas, proposals and resources, along patterns of 'variable geometry', may be a more effective and workable strategy for substantive civil society participation than straightforward political confrontation. In a forward-looking vision, dialogue with Member States to build alliances with non-state actors and consensus around common action agendas is as essential a dimension of the Panel's consultation process as the interaction with civil society and the UN system.
Question 4: how to combine affirmation of universal values with the world's social complexity and cultural diversity. Global governance and cosmopolitan law are based on the recognition of universal values. But universal values and norms cannot be imposed unilaterally. As Habermas puts it, values - including those aspiring to global recognition - do not exist drifting in the air.
They do not have the status of products that can be acquired, circulated or exported all over the world.